Abstract. Is it possible to prove that two DNA-fingerprints match, or that they do not match, without revealing any further information about the fingerprints? Is it possible to prove that two objects have the same design without revealing the design itself? In the digital domain, zero-knowledge is an established concept where a prover convinces a verifier of a statement without revealing any information beyond the statement's validity. However, zero-knowledge is not as well-developed in the context of problems that are inherently physical. In this paper, we are interested in protocols that prove physical properties of physical objects without revealing further information. The literature lacks a unified formal framework for designing and analyzing such protocols. We suggest the first paradigm for formally defining, modeling, and analyzing physical zero-knowledge (PhysicalZK) protocols, using the Universal Composability framework. We also demonstrate applications of physical zero-knowledge to DNA profiling and neutron radiography. Finally, we explore public observation proofs, an analog of public-coin proofs in the context of PhysicalZK.
Introduction
Zero-knowledge proofs are protocols that prove an assertion without revealing any information beyond that assertion's validity. Zero-knowledge proofs were first introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff in 1985 [16] . The power of zero-knowledge proofs is quite remarkable: anything that can be proved efficiently can be proved with a zero-knowledge protocol, under the cryptographic assumption that one-way functions exist (see Goldreich [9] ).
Zero-knowledge proofs have also been considered in a physical setting. A number of works have explored constructions of zero-knowledge protocols that can be physically implemented [26, 19, 24, 23] . One goal of those works was to design protocols with simple procedures and security arguments that the participating parties could easily understand. An added advantage of simple physical protocols is that humans can implement them without the aid of computers. Moran and Naor [24] give methods for polling people on sensitive issues using physical envelopes as an alternative to electronic polling, where humans might not trust computers to behave honestly. Many works have also addressed the incorporation of physical hardware into broader cryptographic schemes. In some cases, these hybrid protocols achieve efficiency or security gains that are unachievable in a standard computation model. Examples of physically realizable functionalities that have been suggested for aiding general cryptographic protocols include tamper-evidence [23] , tamper-proof tokens [12, 7, 21, 22, 25, 20, 18] , one-time programs [15] , and physically uncloneable functions [3] .
Previous literature on zero-knowledge in a physical setting addressed physical protocols for tasks that could otherwise be solved digitally. There is comparatively little formal work on protocols for inherently physical tasks that cannot be solved digitally. One example that has been studied rigorously is distance bounding protocols, introduced by Brands and Chaum in 1993 [2] , in which a verifier party determines or verifies an upper bound on its physical distance to a prover party. In 2012, Glaser, Barak, and Goldston [8] suggested applying zero-knowledge concepts to the task of proving that a nuclear weapon is authentic without revealing sensitive information about its actual design, a problem that arises in the context of nuclear disengagement treaties. They presented an ǫ-knowledge protocol for this task, but did not have a rigorous framework for formally defining and analyzing the protocol's ǫ-knowledge security.
Our contributions. We present the first formal treatment of physical zero-knowledge (PhysicalZK) proofs for inherently physical claims. In our setting, a prover convinces a verifier that an input object satisfies a given physical property. Our framework for designing and analyzing PhysicalZK protocols uses the Universally Composable (UC) security framework [4] , popularly applied in analysis of hybrid protocols involving physical hardware.
Expanding on Glaser et al., we present the first PhysicalZK protocols for the nuclear verification problem, or the general task of verifying object neutron radiograph equality. We also demonstrate an application of PhysicalZK proofs to DNA profiling in which a prover (e.g. a suspect) convinces a verifier (e.g. the police) that its DNA profile does not match a target profile (e.g. obtained from a crime scene) without revealing to the verifier any further information about the profiles, and discuss a protocol for parental testing.
A further goal of our work is to initiate a rigorous study into the foundations of physical zeroknowledge. We point out both differences and similarities between physical and standard ZK where they arise. In particular, Section 3 compares the UC properties of physical vs. digital ZK, and Section 6 explores a physical analog of public coin proofs.
What is physical zero-knowledge (PhysicalZK)?
A standard zero-knowledge proof involves a binary relation R and an input x. A prover convinces a verifier that there exists a witness w such that (x, w) ∈ R. The verifier "learns nothing" from the protocol except the existence of w, and possibly the fact that the prover "knows" w. (See Goldreich [9] for formal definitions, classical theorems, and variants of zero-knowledge).
Previously, the term physical zero-knowledge was used for physically implemented ZK protocols, involving physical tools such as scissors, playing cards, envelopes, or pez dispensers. However, the underlying tasks in those protocols were still logical in nature (e.g. solving a Sudoku puzzle [19] , finding Waldo [26] ).
In our definition of physical zero-knowledge (PhysicalZK), a prover convinces a verifier that a physical input object has a physical property Π. The verifier should "learn nothing" except the validity of the statement "X satisfies Π." A physical measurement M verifies Π, possibly requiring the assistance of a measurement device D. Asymmetry between the prover and the verifier arises not from secret knowledge or computational power, but from access permissions to the object and measurement device. Since a verifier might forcefully break its restricted access, the threat model we consider only addresses adversaries that avoid being caught (similar to the covert adversary model [1] ). Before proceeding, we give a few simple examples.
1. Coke vs. Pepsi "blind test": Alice demonstrates to Bob her ability to distinguish between the tastes of Coke and Pepsi using the classic blind test. However, the simplest test is not zero-knowledge. Bob might give Alice a cup of Sprite, and gain information from her response. One fix is to use indistinguishable coffee lids. Alice observes that Bob prepares cups of Coke and Pepsi. Bob then supplies Alice with the lids, Alice marks the inside of each lid with her secret signature, and covers the cups. After the blind test, Alice commits her response on a piece of paper. But before handing the paper to Bob, she will remove the lid, and check for her signature.
2. Bins and Balls Equality: Alice proves to Bob that two bins X and Y (of capacity n) contain the same number of balls. The following ǫ-knowledge protocol was given in [8] . Alice chooses N > n, and prepares two new pairs of bins, each of capacity N + n, labelled B0 and B1 respectively. Alice chooses two independent random values r0 and r1 uniformly distributed in [0, N ). Concealing the bins from Bob, she adds r0 balls to each bin in B0, and r1 to each bin in B1. Bob randomly selects i ∈ {0, 1}, Alice hands Bob the pair Bi, and Bob checks that both bins in the pair have equal numbers of balls. Alice then pours the contents of X into one bin in the remaining pair, and the contents of Y into the other. Finally, Bob checks the final contents of the bins to verify that they contain equal numbers of balls. Alice's success of cheating is at most 1/2. (Appendix A contains a full analysis).
3. Litmus test: Alice proves to Bob that her solution is basic/acidic without revealing the actual pH. Blue litmus paper turns red in acidic solution, and red litmus paper turns blue in basic solution. First, Bob tests Alice's litmus paper in known basic/acidic solutions to check that it operates correctly. After the protocol is complete, the litmus paper must be completely destroyed (to prevent Bob from later examining traces of the solution remaining on the paper).
3 PhysicalZK in the UC security framework
The UC framework. The Universally Composable security framework (UC) of Canetti [4] defines two worlds: the "real" world in which the real protocol is executed, and the "ideal" world in which an ideal process is implemented with the help of a trusted third party. A protocol environment machine Z interacts with the protocols in both worlds, setting each party's inputs, and reading their outputs. Although Z does not see internal communication between parties, it communicates freely with an adversary A. When A corrupts a party, it assumes the party's identity, and takes control of its communication. A real protocol UC-emulates an ideal process if for every real adversary A there exists an ideal world adversary S such that no environment Z can distinguish between its interactions with A in the real protocol and S in the ideal process. The universal composition theorem states that if π is a protocol involving sub-protocol calls to an ideal functionality F, ρ is a protocol that UC-emulates F, and π ρ/F is the hybrid protocol obtained by replacing calls to F in π with calls to ρ, then π ρ/F UC-emulates π.
Modeling physical protocols. We separate physical protocols into a logical layer and a physical layer. All the physical operations of the protocol belong to the physical layer. Every physical operation serves an ideal function, and can be modeled by an ideal process in an abstract computation model with interactive turing machines (ITMs). This translation is based on physical assumptions. The logical layer is the hybrid world protocol obtained by replacing all physical operations with oracle calls to their ideal functionalities. For example, consider the operation of pouring x balls into a bin and sealing the bin. We can define an ideal functionality T and an ideal process for this operation as follows. T stores tuples of the form (value, id, creator, holder, state). Upon receiving the two commands Create(x, id) and Seal(id) from party P i , T stores the tuple (x, id, P i , P i , sealed), and will deny requests to view the value x that come from any party other than P i . However, any party P j may send a special command Force(id) to T , and T will respond by sending the entire tuple to P j and broadcasting to all other participating parties that P j issued the Force command. This emulates the real behavior of a party who forcefully breaks open the sealed bin without permission, and is labeled a cheater.
Rigorous analysis can be applied to the hybrid world logical layer. We can then interpret the universal composition property of our model as formally reducing security to the most basic physical assumptions necessary: if the hybrid world logical layer UC-emulates F, then any real world physical protocol emulating the hybrid protocol also realizes F.
UC physical commitments. Bit-commitment is impossible to UC-realize in the standard computation model without trusted setup assumptions [5] . However, physical assumptions change matters. Consider the following trivial protocol in which the parties continuously observe each other.
Alice commits to her bit by placing it in a sealed container, and de-commits by opening the container. To prevent Bob from forcibly cheating, Alice could run the protocol behind a secure glass screen (see Section 6 on public observation protocols). There is also a more sophisticated UC secure bit-commitment protocol using tamper-evident envelopes [23] , which does not require continuous observation.
Likewise, ZK is not UC-realizable without setup assumptions, but there are UC-secure ZK proofs for any NP relation given UC bit-commitment [5, 6] . Therefore, it is possible to implement UC-secure ZK protocols for any NP relation using UC physical commitments.
Ideal functionality F Π ZK . The ideal functionality F Π ZK is described in Figure 1 , running with parties Prover, Verifier, and an oracle F C that compiles the ideal functionalities for a collection C of physical operations in the real world. Π is a unary predicate representing a physical property Π. If idX uniquely identifies a physical set X, the statement idX ∈ Π translates the physical world statement "X satisfies property Π." FC includes an ideal functionality F M Π for the physical measurement operation M π required to verify Π, which outputs Π(idX) ∈ {0, 1}. The parameter leak(idX ) represents information that is leaked when Verifier forcefully cheats.
-Upon receiving (idX , pidC, Prover, Verifier) from the party Prover, F Π ZK queries the FC specified by the process identifier pidC to compute Π(idX ), and sends (Π(idX), idX , Π) to Verifier.
-Upon receiving the instruction cheat from Verifier, send (idX , leak(idX )) to Verifier, and send (Cheater, Verifier) to Prover. If Prover sends cheat, send (Cheater, Prover) to Verifier. Upon receiving the instruction fail from either party, send Failed to both parties.
Fig. 1. Ideal world PhysicalZK
Let ρ F C /C denote the F C -hybrid model translation of a physical protocol ρ with physical operation collection C. A proof that ρ F C /C UC-emulates F Π ZK captures (up to physical assumptions) that ρ is secure against any adversary in the real physical world whose behavior is restricted to operations in C. 4 A generic procedure for this analysis is outlined in Figure 2 . Appendix A includes a full UC modeling and security proof for the Bins and Balls Equality protocol of [8] . Let hybrid ρ,F C ,A,Z and ideal F Π ZK ,F C ,S,Z respectively denote the random variables describing the output of environment Z after interacting with A in ρ F C /C and S in the ideal process for F Π ZK .
Definition 1. 5 A physical protocol ρ is a physical zero-knowledge protocol for property Π with respect to the physical operation set C if for any A there exists S such that for all environments Z outputting a single bit:
Main differences from standard F R ZK . One difference is to allow the verifier to obtain leakage by overtly cheating; however, F R ZK could be extended similarly. A more fundamental difference is 4 Ideally, C should define a sufficient set of operations such that any action outside this set will either be recognized as malicious or irrelevant to the protocol. This is not a formal mathematical notion, but a physical assumption. 5 To differentiate statistical, computational, and perfect PhysicalZK, we can easily extend the definition to depend on the type of indistinguishability (statistical/computational/perfect) that the relation ≈ describes.
the way F Π ZK verifies Π. F R ZK requires the prover to submit a witness w along with the input x so that F R ZK may efficiently verify (x, w) ∈ R. F R ZK cannot find a witness w on its own since UC requires the trusted party to be computationally efficient. In contrast, F Π ZK verifies id X ∈ Π on its own, as it only needs the prover to transfer access permissions, not secret knowledge.
This difference has significant consequences. F R ZK cannot be realized in UC without trusted setup because the simulator must straight-line extract a witness from its interaction with the real prover, implying that the real verifier could do so as well. UC-emulation of F Π ZK does not require extraction. Standard ZK proofs in UC are zero-knowledge proofs-of-knowledge (ZKPoK), whereas F Π ZK is not. Thus, although UC protocols for F Π ZK may rely on physical assumptions, they do not fundamentally require trusted setup assumptions.
FC-hybrid protocol UC-emulation of F Π ZK
We can assume that A acts as a proxy for the environment Z [4].
-When A corrupts Verifier, Z either sees a successful run of ρ F C /C , or receives (0, idX , Π). Since S only receives a receipt (Π(idX), idX , Π), it must simulate the hybrid world proof, invoking an instance of FC, and dummy parties P and V . S plays the role of prover (P), and uses Z's messages to play the verifier (V), whose messages S forwards to Z. If failure occurs or cheating is detected in the simulation, S sends either fail or cheat to F 
Neutron radiography
Glaser, Barak, and Goldston [8] were the first to suggest applying zero-knowledge proofs to the problem of authenticating nuclear warheads without revealing sensitive information about their design. One approach to authentication is "template-matching." The inspecting party possesses a template warhead, presumably confirmed to be authentic. The opposing party must prove that each warhead brought to the dismantlement queue is identical (in design) to the template.
Neutron radiography can be used to compare objects. An object is bombarded with neutrons, and the intensity of neutron scattering is measured over a range of angles. Glaser et al. suggested using passive bubble detectors 6 to physically record the neutron counts at randomly selected angles. The task of comparing the physically recorded counts essentially reduces to Bins and Balls Equality. The GBG protocol for Bins and Balls Equality (see Section 2) only achieves ǫ-knowledge with ǫ = n/N (security is broken with O(N ) repetitions). We present a modified protocol that achieves perfect PhysicalZK.
Protocol 4.1 guarantees that the number of balls the verifier eventually counts is uniformly distributed in [N, 2N ). Instead of preparing bin pair j containing r j ∈ [0, N ) balls, the prover prepares a quadruple j of bins: one pair of bins with r j ∈ [0, N ) balls each, and a second with N + r j balls each. If the number of balls in the prover's original bins is x < N , then exactly one of N + r j + x and r j + x lies in the interval [N, 2N ). Only this bin pair is retained and displayed.
Protocol 4.1: Bins and Balls Quadruples
Input: Two bins X and Y, which both contain x and y balls respectively. The maximum capacity of each bin is N.
1. Prover prepares and seals k "quadruples" of bins Q1, ..., Q k , where each "quadruple" Qi consists of two pairs of bins, pairi,0 and pairi,1. Each bin has capacity at least 2N . For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Prover randomly selects uniformly distributed values ri ∈ [0, N ), and prepares each Qi such that each bin in pairi,0 contains ri balls, and each bin in pairi,1 contains ri + N balls. 2. Verifier randomly selects j uniformly distributed in [1, k] , and requests to view all Q i =j . Prover reveals all quadruples Q i =j , and Verifier checks that these quadruples were initialized correctly. 3. Prover selects a final pair out of Qj: if x + rj ≥ N , then Prover chooses pairj,0, and if x + rj < N , then Prover chooses pairj,1. Prover destroys the other pair. 4. Verifier labels the bins in the remaining pair as "binx" and "biny" (he can do this randomly to add a 1/2 factor to the soundness error). 5. Prover pours the contents of X into binx, and the contents of Y into biny. Prover reveals the contents of binx and biny, and Verifier accepts the proof if and only if the two bins contain the same number of balls.
Soundness: The soundness error is at most 1 2k . The verifier would accept a false claim (when x = y) only if it selects a quadruple j ∈ [k] and labeling of the bins in the final pair so that x+ r j = y + r ′ j , where r j and r ′ j are the initializations of the bins labelled bin x and bin y respectively. If more than one quadruple contains an incorrect initialization such that r j = r ′ j , then the verifier catches the prover. If one labeling results in x + r j = y + r ′ j , then the opposite labeling does not. Therefore, this event occurs with probability at most 1 2k . Perfect Zero-Knowledge: We show that the distribution of balls in the final pair of bins (bin x and bin y ) is the uniform distribution over [N, 2N ). Fix an arbitrary input value 0 ≤ a < N for the number of balls that bins X and Y each hold. Let Z denote the number of balls in bin x and bin y at the end of the protocol. Z = r j + a when r j + a ≥ N , and Z = r j + a + N when r j + a < N .
The complete formal proof is very similar to the proof in Appendix A.2. Roughly, since the distribution in the final pair is uniform and independent of the input, the simulator can run the protocol on an empty input.
From bins and balls to neutron bombardment
We adapt Protocol 4.1 to the problem of proving object radiograph equivalence. Neutron detectors are placed at a finite number of angles around each object, and a neutron source is fired at both objects for the same duration of time. A measurement device is used to measure the counts of neutrons that each detector has physically recorded.
Measurement devices. The parties mutually possess a neutron source with a known flow rate, and physical neutron detectors. Each party has its own measurement device D for obtaining the physically recorded neutron count of any neutron detector. In the hybrid world, D is modeled as an ideal functionality F D . When given the input id X corresponding to an object X, F D records a measurement value, and outputs a function of the measured value.
Operation Init(d, r). This initializes the given neutron detector d to the integer value r. We assume that the prover and verifier can perform this operation without the other party knowing the value r. 7 Prover types. We consider two types of provers. Prover Type I has prior knowledge of the exact neutron counts x θ and y θ at any angle θ that the verifier chooses to examine, and Prover Type II does not possess this knowledge.
Drawbacks. A Type I prover is required to know the values of x and y for any angle θ. A Type II prover is allowed to re-handle the detectors after the neutron collection, possibly giving her the opportunity to dishonestly meddle with the results. In Appendix B we include a different zero-knowledge protocol for ORE that avoids both of these issues. The protocol uses a measurement device that outputs neutron counts modulo N. Tolerance δ. The verifier could accept if and only if |x θ − y θ | < δ. Two changes are necessary. First, the prover should choose which pair to discard based on the lower of the two values x and y. Unfortunately, the difference |x − y| is still revealed. Second, the verifier must ensure that N ≥ max θ {|x θ −y θ |+δ}. Otherwise the prover could fool the verifier into accepting that |x θ −y θ | < δ when |x θ − y θ | > N − δ. Verifier can incorporate checking the size of N into the cut-and-choose protocol, but needs to know some loose upper bound on x θ − y θ .
Soundness and Completeness: Protocol 4.2 has perfect completeness and soundness error at most ( 1+β 2 ) k , where β < 1 is the probability that x θ = y θ at a uniformly distributed angle θ (when X ∼ Y ). Suppose Prover cheats on c out of k detector quadruples. The probability that Verifier doesn't check any of the c bad quadruples is 2 −c . The probability Prover passes on all the k − c good quadruples is 
DNA profiling
In recent years, genetic privacy in DNA profiling has become the subject of wide debate. Privacy issues obstruct criminal investigations, deterring non-guilty suspects from otherwise providing DNA samples, and giving guilty suspects legitimate excuses to refuse testing. We present a zero-knowledge protocol through which a suspect can prove to the police that his DNA profile does not match a crime scene profile. We also sketch an adaptation of the BBQ (Protocol 4.1) primitive to DNA testing. One potential application is a zero-knowledge protocol for parental testing.
STR analysis. DNA profiling uses STR analysis. STR stands for "Short Tandem Repeats," which are short nucleotide sequences that repeat in tandem. In certain locations of the human genome, although all humans posses the same repeating sequence, the exact number of repeat units is highly variable from person to person. The variations of a gene or genetic locus in the human population are called alleles. Every individual has two alleles of each gene, one from each parent.
CODIS profiles. In the United States, all forensic laboratories share CODIS (the Combined DNA Index System), which uses 13 specific STR loci to identify individuals. A CODIS DNA profile vector consists of 13 pairs of STR sequence lengths, one pair for each loci.
DNA primers. A genetic profile is generated through STR analysis. PCR (the polymerase chain reaction) is run with oligonucleotide primers to isolate and amplify each STR repeat sequence. Primers determine the specific start and end nucleotides of the sequence to be amplified, and thus control the lengths of the flanking regions that are cut out along with the STR sequences (see Figure 3 ). We will use the notation P i,j to denote a primer pair that isolates the ith locus STR sequence, and produces a pair of fragments of sizes m i,1 + j and m i,2 + j, when m i,1 and m i,2 are the sizes of the ith locus alleles.
Electrophoresis. In capillary electrophoresis, the most popular technique for DNA profiling, DNA fragments are fluorescently labelled during PCR, and passed through a capillary tube. Smaller fragments pass faster than larger ones. A laser detects the fragments as they pass by. The length of a fragment is deduced from the time the fragment takes to reach the laser.
δ-CE device. We imagine a slightly modified capillary electrophoresis apparatus in which the laser can only be operated for a limited time window δ, effectively limiting the range of DNA fragment sizes that will be detected. 8 
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DNA Inequality
At a basic level, the police (POL) will give the defender (DEF) one of the two DNA samples at random, and DEF must correctly identify the sample received. In general, DEF is not the sus-pect, but a public defender forensic team representing the suspect. There are two main challenges in proving zero-knowledge. First, the protocol simulator needs to extract the verifier's challenges without rewinding. Second, we must prevent POL from substituting a third auxiliary DNA sample mid-protocol. (Similarly, in the ZK protocol for graph non-isomorphism (GNI), the verifier proves it knows an isomorphism between its challenge graph and one of the two input graphs [11] ). Additionally, we rely on the physical assumption that two DNA samples from the same person are always indistinguishable, whereas samples from individuals with distinct profiles are always distinguishable. Random seals. We require non-forgeable tamper-evident seals. We imagine that tamperevident seals could be manufactured with a "random" pattern that is uniformly and independently distributed in a sufficiently large domain. A similar random pattern trick was suggested in [26] .
Seal covers. Our protocol also requires seal covers that function as physical commitments. The covers should be designed to hide any identifiable markings on the tamper-evident seals, and it should be possible to open the seals without removing their covers.
Protocol 5.1: Zero-knowledge proof for DNA inequality
Preparation: Two test tubes are jointly prepared, one with DNA sample C, and one with S. DEF places identifiable tamper-evident seals on each test tube: one identifies S, and the other identifies C. POL covers the seals.
1. POL conceals the two test tubes, selects one randomly, and hands it back to DEF. 2. DEF checks that the seal has not yet been opened, and then opens the seal without removing its cover.
DEF determines the profile of the sample in the test tube, and physically commits to the identity of the sample in the test tube. 3. POL "de-commits" to the challenge test tube by removing the cover on its seal. 4. DEF checks and identifies the uncovered seal to see that it wasn't replaced. If it is not the original seal, then DEF terminates the protocol. Otherwise, DEF opens its commitment from Step 2. 5. POL checks that DEF committed to the correct identity of the challenge sample.
Completeness and Soundness. As DEF is able to differentiate between two distinct DNA samples, the protocol has perfect completeness. If the DNA samples are the same, DEF guesses the challenge sample correctly with probability 1/2. (The error is exponentially reduced by repetition).
Hybrid model. The compiler holds tuples for each DNA sample input. The value attribute of each tuple is the DNA profile vector. The random seal operations queries an RO for a value r, tags r to the tuple, locks read/write access, and outputs r to the calling party. The scramble functionality swaps the id attributes of two tuples with probability 1/2. The environment machine initializes and locks tuples for each DNA input sample. This emulates the "joint preparation" for the physical reason that no information is revealed to either party until they use analysis tools, such as electrophoresis, to examine the products of the PCR preparation.
Zero-Knowledge. The ideal functionality DNA Inequality is denoted F DI ZK . The job of the simulator S in the case that A corrupts the hybrid world prover (DEF) was handled generically in Section 3, Figure 2 . The case that A corrupts the hybrid world verifier (POL) is more interesting. First, S learns from F DI ZK if DEF passes or fails the ideal execution on the environment Z's input. Next, S simulates the hybrid model protocol, playing the role of DEF while Z uses A to control POL. Recall that S can straight-line extract physical commitments in the hybrid world (see Figure 2) . Thus, S always knows the identity of POL's challenge sample, or that POL is cheating. S sets DEF's commitment in Step 2 to the correct identity of the challenge if DEF should pass, and the incorrect if DEF should fail. S only de-commits in Step 4 if POL did not cheat. If POL did not cheat, both S and the hybrid world DEF supply identical responses to Z, namely the identity of POL's challenge. If POL did cheat on its challenge, then S terminates its simulation. The hybrid world DEF will also terminate unless it fails to catch POL cheating, which only occurs with negligible probability (POL must guess the secret RO tag in order to fool DEF).
Testing a village. There are cases where entire villages have been tested to see if the DNA profile of anyone in the population matches the crime scene DNA profile. Protocol 5.1 can be naturally extended for proving that a DNA profile does not exist in a population. Consider a population of 400 people. The verifier DEF receives 401 DNA samples, one from every individual in the population, plus a crime scene sample, all delivered in a set of 401 identical, covered, sealed, and randomly permuted test-tubes. DEF is required to find the crime scene sample C and hand it back to POL. If another individual has the same profile as C, then DEF fails with probability at least 
Parental testing
To prove a parent-child relationship using DNA profiling, it is necessary to show that DNA samples from the parent and child share at least one allele in each STR locus. We construct a zero-knowledge protocol for this task using an analogous technique to the Bins and Balls Quadruples (BBQ) scheme from Section 4.
Recall that a primer P i,j is used to cut out the ith locus STR alleles with flanking regions of total length j. Performing STR analysis with randomized primers P i,r i for r i uniformly distributed in [0, N ) is analogous to adding a random number of balls to a bin. The quadruples of bins in BBQ translate to quadruples of test tubes running reactions with randomized primers. However, a technical caveat arises: each ith locus actually contains a pair of alleles that will be amplified with the same P i,r i , producing a pair of fragment lengths whose joint distribution is not necessarily uniform!
In the special case of paternity testing, this issue can be easily avoided by choosing to compare STR regions on the Y chromosome, which is uniquely passed from father to son. In more general circumstances, the prover can choose to reveal only one allele from each locus (using δ-CE), which is sufficient for showing that the two DNA samples share at least one allele in each STR locus.
Public coin and public observation proofs
A private coin protocol is one in which the verifier's random bits ("coin flips") must be kept private during the protocol. In contrast, the verifier's messages in a public coin protocol only consist of the outcomes of its coin flips. Public-coin physical protocols are publicly observable in the sense that the verifier can sit behind a glass screen throughout the protocol's execution, sending messages to the prover, and observing the prover's physical operations. Thus, unlike general physical zeroknowledge protocols, public observation physical zero-knowledge protocols do not rely on tamperevident functionalities or (as heavily) on a covert threat model. While all public-coin protocols are publicly observable, not all publicly observable protocols need to be public-coin. For instance, the protocol may involve private-coin computational subprotocols.
In this section, we present an example of a public observation protocol for a special case of DNA Inequality in which the suspect's DNA S should pass if in at least one of the 13 CODIS loci it has an allele that is not present in the crime scene DNA C (notated S ⊂ C). The protocol becomes a perfectly complete test for DNA Inequality when only homozygotic gene regions are compared (e.g. X or Y chromosomes in males). The construction of the protocol involves a reduction to standard cryptography, using bit-commitment and generic ZK proofs for NP statements. Our protocol takes advantage of the fact that when S ⊂ C, the total number of distinct gene alleles in S ∪ C increases. Our protocol is closely related to the well-known public-coin protocol for GNI, making use of a classical set lower-bound protocol [17, 10] .
In the digital setting, public-coin ZK equals private-coin ZK [27, 13, 14, 28] . In contrast, we don't know of a general method for converting any physical zero-knowledge protocol into a public observation zero-knowledge protocol. The known constructions of public-coin ZK proofs from private-coin ZK proofs involve simulating the private-coin verifier and applying universal hash functions to its messages. We do not know of any general analogous method for hashing physical messages. Furthermore, the public-coin verifier must be able to check set containment in the private-coin verifier's messages. In the physical setting, it is unclear whether the public-coin verifier can always assess the physical content of the private-coin verifier's messages, particularly when they involve physical concealment.f DEF has a mod δ-CE device, which is a δ-CE device that displays the lengths of DNA fragments modulo N , where N is a power of 2 greater than the longest possible fragment that will be measured. DEF also has access to a collection of DNA primers {P i,j }. -Parameters ℓ and m. Choose the smallest integers ℓ and m that satisfy the following conditions: ( 13 is the set of possible vectors whose ith component is the length mod N of an allele taken from the ith locus of either S or C. It is the set of vectors of allele lengths mod N corresponding to V (S ∪ C). -Randomized allele length vector set r(Z ℓ ). Let r be a random uniformly distributed vector in (Z N ) 13ℓ . Define r(Z ℓ ) = {r + z | z ∈ Z ℓ } where addition is over (Z N ) 13ℓ . -Hash function family. Set k = log(N ) · 13ℓ, and choose a canonical encoding of (Z N ) 13ℓ in GF (2 k ). We will use a family H k,m := {h a,b } of universal hash functions from GF (2 k ) → GF (2 m ) where a, b ∈ GF (2 k ), a = 0, and h a,b maps x → ax + b and truncates the last k − m bits. -Hash function shift. For any vector r ∈ (Z N ) 13ℓ and h ∈ H k,m , define r(h) = h a,b−r·a , where r is the encoding of r in GF (2 k ). Note that r(h)(r + z) = h(z). -Preparing r(Z ℓ ). DEF prepares ℓ sets of test tubes T 1 , ..., T ℓ . Each T i consists of test tubes {C i,j } j∈ [13] containing C and {S i,j } j∈ [13] containing S. For all (i, j), DEF selects an independent random value r i,j uniformly distributed in [0, N ), and then runs PCR on C i,j and S i,j with the primer pair P j,r i,j . 10 To display a vector z ∈ r(Z ℓ ) to P OL, DEF chooses from every T i the appropriate set of 13 test tubes containing the target fragments contained in z, and then chooses time windows t i,1 , ..., t i,13 to run the mod δ-CE device on each test tube in order to only detect the target fragments.
Perfect Completeness: We use the fact that for any set A ⊆ {0, 1} m of size |A| ≥ 2 m− 1 2 , there there exists an (expected polynomial time computable) set of m hash functions h 1 , ..., h m ∈ H k,m
r for r ≤ 13. Choose the smallest integer x such that (
K) + 1. One can verify that x ≤ 15. Now find the smallest ℓ ≥ x such that the fractional part of ℓ · log(
, 1) ∪ {0}. This will hold for either x, x +1, or x +2. Finally, set m to be the unique integer such that m− 
)
ℓ ≥ 2ℓ · log( 
K)
ℓ ≤ 2 m . 10 P OL observes that the same primer is applied to Ci,j and Si,j . Protocol 6.1 -Public observation ZK for DNA Inequality P OL observes DEF throughout the rounds. We assume that DEF cannot change the behavior of the mod δ-CE device while under observation. Let (com, dec) denote a commitment scheme.
DEF: Choose a random uniformly distributed r ∈ (ZN )
13ℓ and prepare r(Z ℓ ). Find a set of m hash functions
Compute commitments to the hash functions r(hi) for each i, denoted ComH = {com(r(h1)), ..., com(r(hm))}. Send ComH to POL. 2. POL: Pick a uniformly distributed y ∈ {0, 1} m . 3. DEF: Find an hi ∈ H and z ∈ Z ℓ such that hi(z) = y. Display the allele vector v = z + r from the set r(Z ℓ ). 4. DEF and POL: Execute a UC-secure ZK proof of the NP statement "there exists x ∈ ComH such that dec(x) = h and h(v) = y."
We include a proof of this fact using the Probabilistic Method in the full version of this paper).When S has at least one distinct allele from C, then
. Given any z there is at least one h i among the m preselected functions that satisfies h i (z) = y. Since r(h i )(z + r) = h i (z) = y, there exists h ∈ Com H such that h(v) = y.
Soundness error 1/2: When S does not contain any distinct alleles from C, then |Z| = |V (C)
Thus, the probability that a uniformly selected target y ∈ {0, 1} m is in the image
Note that this soundness error bound is independent of the prover's mod δ-CE device behavior, whether randomized or deterministic. The device output ensemble consists of at most 2 m−1 /m distinct random variables over {0, 1} m , i.e. one variable X z for each input configuration z ∈ Z ℓ . Given the uniformly selected target y, the probability that h i (X z ) = y for some i and z is (by a union bound) at most 1/2.
Zero-Knowledge:
We separately analyze the physical (DEF reveals v to POL) and computational (DEF proves there exists x ∈ Com H such that dec(x) = h and h(v) = y) stages of the protocol. In the physical stage, POL only sees the indices of v = z + r, and since r is uniformly distributed independent of z, v is also uniformly distributed. In the computational stage, DEF and POL execute a ZK protocol that is UC-secure under either physical assumptions or computational setup assumptions. The composed protocol securely realizes PhysicalZK by the universal composition theorem.
Conclusion and Future Directions
The need for privacy pervades not only the world of digital information, but physical information as well. Privacy in nuclear disengagement treaties and DNA profiling are just two examples of pertinent real world problems requiring inherently physical rather than digital solutions, and motivate the importance of developing a better theoretical foundation for physical cryptography.
A starting point is the rigorous analysis of protocols. The approach presented in this work separates the logical and physical components of a protocol using the language of modern cryptography, formally reducing mathematical claims of security and correctness to the underlying physical assumptions theory cannot address. Beyond that, there are structural questions: are there ZK proofs for every physical property, or secure computation protocols for every physical task? We noted parallels between public observation physical ZK protocols and public coin digital ZK protocols. Can any physical ZK protocol be made into a publicly observable one?
In the physical world, opposite to the digital, general theories and impossibility results seem difficult or impossible to achieve with only the tools of mathematics. Nonetheless, investigating general theories is an interesting direction for future work, perhaps beginning with restricted classes of physical operations. An orthogonal direction is to explore other models. In subsequent work, we show several techniques for solving generic physical tasks using a disposable circuits model in which digital information can be destroyed. Hybrid protocol experiment. Z activates F BB and sets the input to π, the F BB -hybrid protocol, by initializing the tuples (id X , x, Prover, "sealed") and (id Y , y, Prover, "sealed"). Next, Z activates Prover and Verifier, sending them the process identifier pid BB for F BB . Prover and Verifier execute π as described in Figure 5 . A corrupts one, both, or none of the parties. A controls the communication of any party it corrupts, but only acts as a proxy for Z. After π has completed, each party sends its output to Z, who's final view of the experiment consists of its communication tape with A and the outputs of Prover and Verifier. Finally, Z outputs a single decision bit hybrid π,F BB ,A,Z .
Ideal process experiment. Z activates F BB with process identifier pid BB and initializes the tuples (id X , x, Prover, "sealed") and (id Y , y, Prover, "sealed"). Z sends (id X , id Y , pid BB ) to both Prover and Verifier. Prover will activate F BBE ZK,δ , whose PID we denote as ⊥. First, Prover transfers input tuple access to F BBE ZK,δ , executing Transfer(id X , ⊥) and Transfer(id Y , ⊥). Next, it sends pid BB and the input (id X , id Y , pid BB , Prover, Verifier) to F BBE ZK,δ , which in turn proceeds according to Figure 6 . As in [4] , F BBE ZK,δ will also mediate the ideal adversary corruption mechanism. S corrupts a party P by sending the command (corrupt P ) to F BBE ZK,δ . Since S cannot corrupt P before F BBE ZK,δ is activated, S cannot modify the environment's input before F BBE ZK,δ receives it. Thus, while S may modify outputs to its corrupted parties, it cannot compromise the ideal process's output to an uncorrupted party. Prover and Verifier both forward the outputs they receive to Z, and Z outputs a single decision bit ideal F BBE ZK ,F BB ,S,Z . 
Input: F BB has the input stored as (idX , x, Prover, "sealed") and (idY , y, Prover, "sealed") where 0 ≤ x, y ≤ n.
If x = y, Prover sends (Reject, (idX , idY ), BBE) to Verifier. If x = y:
1. Prover: Randomly select r0, r1 in [0,N). Create (r0) twice and Create (r1) twice, receiving receipts from F BB with four unique id values B0,0, B0,1, B1,0, and B1,1. For each Bi,j , Seal(Bi,j) and Send(Bi,j , Verifier). 2. Verifier: Select a random choice bit σ ∈ {0, 1}. Send (σ, Prover). If the protocol prematurely fails due to an invalid message or operation, both parties output Failed. If Prover ever receives a receipt (Force, Verifier, accept) from FBB, it outputs (Cheater, Verifier). -Upon receiving (idX , idY , pid, Prover, Verifier) from the party Prover, query the instance of F BB specified by pid to obtain the tuples (idX , x, ⊥, "sealed") and (idY , y, ⊥, "sealed"). If x = y, send (Accept, (idX , idY ), BBE) to the party Verifier. If x = y, send (Reject, (idX, idY ), BBE). -Upon receiving the instruction (Cheat, µ) from Prover for 0 ≤ µ ≤ δ, with probability µ send (Accept, (idX , idY ), BBE) to Verifier, and otherwise send (Cheater, Prover). Upon receiving the instruction Cheat from Verifier, send (Cheater, Verifier) to Prover, and (Cheater, x, y) to Verifier. -If the queries to F BB are unsuccessful, the initial input is invalid, or upon receiving the instruction Fail from either party, send Failed to both parties. We will show that for all A there exists S such that for any environment Z, the environment's respective views in the hybrid protocol experiment with A and the ideal process experiment with S are ǫ-close in statistical distance. We consider separately the four cases in which A corrupts the Prover, the Verifier, both parties, or neither parties. (We continue to write F BBE ZK,δ , but it should be understood that δ = 1/2).
A corrupts Prover. S obtains (id X , id Y , pid BB ) from F BBE ZK,δ . S runs a separate instance of F BB , and simulates the hybrid protocol π using empty entries for id X and id Y , and two dummy parties P (for Prover) and V (for Verifier). S plays P using the messages coming from Z. S sends back to Z any receipts that P receives from F BB . However, S does not send P's output from the simulation Z. Instead, it sends one of the following messages to F BBE ZK,δ : -If either P or V output Failed, then S sends Fail.
-If P cheated in the initialization of only one pair, then S sends (Cheat, 1/2).
-If P cheated in the initialization of both pairs, then S sends (Cheat, 0).
-If none of the above apply, then S sends (id X , id Y , pid BB , Prover, Verifier).
Verifier writes the output received from F BBE ZK,δ to its local output tape. S receives Prover's output from F BBE ZK,δ , and writes it to Prover's output tape. Z's view is identical to its view in the hybrid protocol experiment with A corrupting Prover.
A corrupts Verifier. S obtains Z's input (id X , id Y , pid BB ), and receives output from F BBE ZK,δ : either (Accept, (id X , id Y ), BBE) in the case that x = y, or (Reject, (id X , id Y ), BBE) in the case that x = y. If Reject, then S writes the output to Verifier's output tape. If Accept, then S must simulate A's view of the hybrid protocol π.
S runs a separate instance of F BB , creating empty entries for id X and id Y , and dummy parties P and V . S uses messages coming from Z to play V , and forwards any receipts that V receives to Z. The only possible receipts V receives that could be statistically different in this simulated π and the hybrid experiment π are the receipts (B σ,0 , v π ) and (B σ,1 , v ′ π ) obtained in Step 6. Since the output is Accept, we know that v π = v ′ π . v π is uniformly distributed in [x, x + N ), and the simulation output v sim is uniformly distributed in [0, N ). The statistical difference is ∆(v π , v sim ) = x/N ≤ n/N = ǫ.
Next, S determines what message to send F BBE ZK,δ . If P outputs Cheater, it sends Cheat to F BBE ZK,δ , receives (Cheater, x, y) as output, and writes to Verifier's output tape whatever A would. If P outputs Failed, S sends Fail, and writes Failed to Verifier's output tape. Otherwise, S does not send anything, and simply writes (Accept, (id X , id Y ), BBE) to Verifier's output tape.
The outputs are identical to the outputs in the hybrid protocol experiment given the same inputs. Therefore, the statistical difference between Z's views of the hybrid protocol experiment and ideal process experiment on the same inputs is precisely the statistical difference in its communication with A and S during π and the simulated π, which is at most ǫ = n/N .
A corrupts both or neither parties. If both, then S also corrupts both. Since there are no secrets kept from S, it can run the hybrid world experiment without help. If neither, S does nothing. For the same inputs, the outputs of Prover and Verifier are identical in the hybrid protocol experiment and the ideal process experiment when there is no corruption.
By Lemma 1, the GBG protocol is a physical ǫ-knowledge protocol for BBE with respect to the operation set BB.
B ORE with a mod-counter
We present an alternative zero-knowledge protocol for ORE using a mod-counter, a measurement device that outputs neutron counts modulo N. When N is greater than the maximum possible neutron count, the neutron counts are equal if and only if they are congruent modulo N.
Who brings the mod-counter M? The verifier cannot trust a prover's device to output correct values. Likewise, the prover cannot trust the verifier, who might program the device to secretly store actual integer count values. Thus, our solution is to have the verifier program check the prover's mod-counter. We model M as an adaptive program computing a sequence of functions {f i } on a sequence of inputs d i , where each f i is a function of d 1 , ..., d i , and each d i is a physical neutron detector. We assume that the prover cannot remotely change the device's state once the verifier takes possession of it.
1. Prover's preparation: The prover prepares and labels m detector pairs. In each pair 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the prover initializes the count of both detectors, 
